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Abstract 
 
While significant factors that affect the open source community’s interest to participate in a 
development project have been studied, there has been little focus on the motivating factors that can 
cause a contributor to become a competitor by utilizing the right to fork a program i.e., to copy an 
existing program’s code base and use it to begin a separate development. 
 
The right to copy an existing program’s code base and use it to begin a separate development is 
guaranteed by all open source licenses. However, this right to fork a program is rarely exercised. 
Indeed, there is strong social pressure against code forking stemming from the negative side effects 
of code forking, such as conflict and duplicated efforts among developers. 
 
This paper details the events that led Widenius, the founder of the MySQL project, to decide to fork 
MariaDB from MySQL. Our findings confirm the previously held notion that there is a high 
threshold for starting a competing fork. While the few studies that exist of competitive forks find the 
reasons to be due to disagreement among developers, in the case of MariaDB the fork was caused by 
Widenius’ concerns regarding the uncertainty of the future freedom and openness of the MySQL 
codebase. 
 
This article makes three contributions. Firstly, it further validates the existing notion that there is a 
strong threshold to starting a competing fork. Secondly, it offers an in-depth analysis of the events 
and motivations behind the birth of a fork. Thirdly, it contributes to theory by introducing the 
freedom factor hypothesis: limiting either developers’ freedoms to contribute to a project or the 
freedom inherent in a project's license increases the likelihood of a fork. 
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Code forking, open source software development, open source business models 
 
Introduction 
 
Before software became a viable market in itself, there was not “open source” or “proprietary” 
software; there was just software. The computer hardware industry saw software as a tool through 
which one could access their proprietary hardware. Therefore, they freely provided software to be 
distributed with their hardware. At this time, much of what users needed was developed by the users 
themselves sharing code and ideas among one another. Far from being frowned upon, this practice 
was actually encouraged by most vendors, as it aided the sale of hardware (Levy, 2010). Out of this 
group of people who developed and shared software evolved the “hackers”. Many of these hackers 
were MIT computer enthusiasts with their own subculture, values and ethic. Among the central tenets 
in the hacker ethic were openness, the sharing of knowledge that others can benefit from, and the 
freedom of information (ibid.). A further element of the hacker attitude was that “no problem should 
ever have to be solved twice”, with closed source licensing (i.e. proprietary software) commonly 
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seen as erecting “artificial technical, legal, or institutional barriers […] that prevent a good solution 
from being re-used and force people to re-invent wheels” (Raymond, 1999a; emphasis in original). 
 
Therefore, the open source development model has its roots in the early ‘hacker’ culture. As 
computers became more affordable, and thus more commonplace, the need for software grew. In 
1969 IBM unbundled their software and hardware (IBM Archives), considered a pivotal event in the 
birth and growth of the commercial software industry (e.g. Grad, 2002), and with it the growth of the 
proprietary license. Richard Stallman, who had been a part of the hacker community at MIT, saw the 
rise of proprietary code around him and wanted to “create a new software-sharing community” 
(Stallman, 1999). In 1984, in what can arguably be called the beginning of the free (and open source) 
software movement, Stallman began the GNU project, the goal of which was to create a free, and 
freely sharable, operating system (ibid.)
1
. In essence, the free and open source movement began not 
so much to instigate a change in software licensing, but to ensure that software development could 
continue on as it had before: with free access to code and the right to modify and share programs 
according to one’s own needs. 
 
Over time, corporations began producing, acquiring and distributing open source software, creating a 
dynamic in which the community desire for freedom and access to the code must coexist with 
corporate needs. While the direct profitability of a specific open source project may not be the goal 
of a corporation (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2002; West, 2003), corporate participation in the open source 
market necessitates a significant balance between the needs of the community and those of the 
corporation. 
 
Types of OS projects, business models, and architectures of participation 
 
Among extant categories of open source projects, a common dividing factor is that of community 
versus corporation as the owner and driving force behind the project (e.g. West and O’Mahoney, 
2005; Markus, 2007; O’Mahoney, 2007). West and O’Mahoney (2008) use the classification terms 
“autonomous” versus “sponsored” projects. An autonomous project is a community-developed 
project, in which governance and control are shared widely among the community. In some cases, a 
non-profit foundation is created to support autonomous projects and delineate ownership. In a 
sponsored open source project, the community's short or long-term activities are controlled by one or 
more corporate entities (ibid.). Figure 1 shows a development model for a sponsored (or “corporate”) 
open source project. In this model, the primary driving force is the sponsor company. However, the 
project also receives ancillary support from the open source community and corporate community, 
normally made up of companies that use the software or for whom its development is otherwise 
significant. Members of the corporate community commonly contribute either money or developer 
time to the project. 
                                                 
1
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Figure 1: Example of a corporate (“sponsored”) open source project development 
 
 
Sponsored and community projects differ both in their developer communities and in their 
architectures of participation (West and O’Mahoney, 2008). One key difference is that sponsored 
projects need to manage the tension between sponsor and participant goals, essentially community 
desires and profit. An array of business models have emerged to meet the financial needs of 
sponsored projects. A central difference between these business models is whether or not the entire 
product is offered under an open source license. Among those that do offer their entire product as 
open source, perhaps the most common means of generating income is through the sale of support 
and other services. Here, the software can be downloaded free of charge and income is generated 
through providing support and services for the software. Another monetization strategy is to license 
part of a program as open source, with commercial (i.e. closed source) extensions sold to 
complement the open source element. This approach is commonly called “open core”, as the “core” 
of the program is open source. A third approach is dual licensing, in which the program is made 
available under an open source license, but the company also sells a closed source version of the 
same program. This is typically of interest mainly for companies that need to embed the company's 
software within their own proprietary software. 
 
Licensing concerns are known to be a significant factor in corporate software adoption decisions 
(Daffara, 2011); however, the question of how business models and licensing affect community 
participation has seen little direct study. The handling of different licenses and using them “in a 
fruitful manner” is a substantial challenge in the shaping of a corporation's relationship to its open 
source community (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005). In fact, “being specific about licensing 
practices is a prerequisite for firms to be trusted in the open source community” (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008). Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) note that there is an “’implicit promise’ based on 
the non-written rules of the Free Software community”; if a company breaks this promise, developers 
are likely to stop cooperating or migrate to other projects. Similarly, Bacon (2009) notes that “the 
governance body should be tasked with the responsibility of always maintaining and defending the 
primary values of the community and standing up against any improper requests that may result from 
commercial sponsors”. While the hacker culture is not intrinsically against profitability, it has been 
documented that some members of the community object to profitability when project income is 
generated at the cost of openness. This situation is exemplified by the open core approach to 
 Company (”sponsor”) 
 Corporate community 
 Open source community 
 Development  
Product 
(Open source) 
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licensing. On one side of the debate are those that underline the importance of generating income to 
fund future development efforts, on the other are those that consider open core to be a “bait-and-
switch […] offering the promise of open source but not delivering it” (e.g. Phipps, 2010). Indeed, 
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005: 490) note that “the developers and users of the Roxen web server 
went to other projects after the firm released its proprietary add-on”. Furthermore, of the four 
companies they studied, those using an open core business model were less successful in attracting 
and maintaining a community than those projects that were entirely open source (ibid.). A final 
community concern worth noting is that of a corporation “hijacking” the code (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 
2002; Ciffolilli, 2004) by changing a project's source code from an open source to a closed source 
license. 
 
Code forking; when participation becomes competition 
 
As early as the late 1960s, the reuse of code was proposed as a means of building large, reliable 
software systems in a controlled, cost-effective way (Naur and Randell, 1969; Krueger, 1992). Today, 
all open source licenses guarantee the right to reuse a program's code (see the Open Source 
Initiative’s open source definition at opensource.org/osd). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that code 
reuse has become a common practice in open source software (Haefliger, von Krogh, and Spaeth, 
2008). Furthermore, open source licenses do not restrict the amount of code that can be reused, 
meaning programmers can even reuse entire programs. Such a practice, taking an entire code base to 
use as the base for a new project, is commonly called forking the code, or “code forking”. The ability 
to fork has a significant effect on the governance and sustainability of open source software (e.g. 
Nyman et al. 2011 & 2012; Nyman and Lindman, 2013). 
 
The majority of forks
2
 are benign, started for a variety of non-competitive reasons such as: to modify 
a program to better suit their needs; as a means of experimenting with new solutions or features with 
the intent of merging them back into the original project
3
; or because the original has been 
abandoned and is no longer being actively developed (Nyman & Mikkonen, 2011; G. Robles and J.M. 
González-Barahona, 2012). However, a fork may also occur due to disagreements among the 
developers, resulting in the splitting of the developer group and the forming of a separate, competing 
project (e.g. Raymond, 1999b; Fogel, 2009). This situation will be termed “competing forks” for the 
purposes of this paper. While even a situation in which the forks do compete can have benefits (e.g. 
Nyman et al. 2012), developers seek to avoid such forks as they are likely to result in a duplication of 
effort, a splitting and confusing of the community, as well as the potential demise of one (or both) of 
the projects. Therefore, while open source licenses guarantee developers the right to start a 
competing fork, social pressure discourages the exercising of that right (e.g. Meeker, 2008). Indeed, 
such cases are rare enough to be “remembered in the hacker folklore” (Raymond, 1999b). 
 
Robles and González-Barahona (2012) studied 220 forks, noting that only 16 of the forks (7.3%) 
were due to differences among the developer team. Similarly, a study focused on the motivations 
developers stated for starting forks found only a few indications of differences of opinion
4
 and no 
indications that disagreement among the developers influenced the decision to fork (Nyman and 
Mikkonen, 2011). Given the rarity of competing forks, it is unsurprising that there is little knowledge 
of the causes of these forks. Gamalielsson and Lundell (2012) studied the LibreOffice competing 
fork of OpenOffice, finding that a competing fork can be sustainable over time. However, beyond 
noting that it had occurred due to tensions in the original project, an in-depth analysis of the 
motivation behind the fork was not an area of focus. While the limited studies that exist support the 
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3Sometimes called “branches” rather than forks. 
4
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notion that competitive forks are rare, we still know little about the exact nature of the disagreements 
that spawned them.  Given that competitive forks are so actively avoided, cases in which they do 
happen are interesting extremes worthy of study. 
 
Aim and Method 
 
Given the scarcity of studies of the root causes of competitive forks, we examine one case in-depth to 
answer the question: why was the MariaDB fork started? Secondly, this article aims to determine 
why the fork was not instigated by earlier conflicts
5
. To answer the research questions, this paper 
details and analyzes a single-case study (Yin, 2009). The primary source of empirical data is based 
on interviews with Michael (“Monty”) Widenius, the founder of both MySQL and MariaDB. Two in 
person interviews were conducted, averaging 45 minutes in length. Email and phone conversations 
were used for follow-up questions. The data set, consisting of transcriptions from the interviews, was 
complemented with archival research for triangulation (ibid.). The archival research consisted of 
Widenius’ blog; press releases and other relevant information available on the MariaDB, MySQL, 
MariaDB Foundation, Monty program and Oracle websites, industry articles about MariaDB as well 
as interviews with Widenius reported in the following journals: ArsTechnica, Computer World, 
Forbes, H-Online, Info World, ITWire, Linux Journal, Techradar, and ZD Net. We also conducted 
searches for MariaDB, Widenius, Sun, and Oracle on community site Slashdot, and included all 
relevant articles. This author had interviewed Widenius once previously for a separate project. The 
transcripts from that interview were also included in the data used in the creation of this case study. 
 
Most of the secondary data was gathered and examined prior to the personal interview. The first 
personal interview was used to clarify the motivations for the fork and fill in the gaps left by the 
secondary data. The second interview was used to ensure that the representation and interpretation of 
the case were accurate and complete. As the purpose of this paper was to describe why MariaDB was 
forked, I have chosen to focus on the viewpoints of Widenius, the person behind the fork, and have 
not asked other parties of their viewpoints on the matter. 
 
Discussion 
 
This article began with a discussion of a common means of development for sponsored open source 
projects, an approach also adopted by MySQL. It went on to discuss business models, licensing, 
architectures of participation, as well as the concept of code forking. We will now discuss in further 
detail the issues and events relevant to the research questions: why was the MariaDB fork started and 
are forks actively avoided. A list of significant events during the lead up to the birth of MariaDB is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Significant events leading up to the MariaDB fork 
2001 MySQL takes on outside financing. The shareholder agreement includes a section 
forbidding the changing of MySQL’s license without the consent of the founders 
(Widenius and Axmark), thereby guarding against a switch to a proprietary or open 
core business model. The same clause is included in all subsequent financing rounds. 
2008, January MySQL is acquired by Sun. (Widenius becomes financially independent.) 
2008, January First Maria engine is released. Attempts are made on MySQL's part to stop release 
unless Widenius changes the name. Widenius replies “Try and stop me.” 
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2008, April MySQL CEO announces MySQL will include commercial extensions. Widenius 
informs Sun about the announcement; Sun is against it. 
2008, May MySQL CEO announces that MySQL is and will remain open. 
2008, Spring/Summer Developers unhappy at Sun, say (Widenius notes) that they want to be moved 
to work under Widenius or they will leave. 
2008, Fall Widenius leaves Sun, posts an open invitation for MySQL programmers to join his 
new company Monty Program. The majority (“All but one”) of the core MySQL 
developers join him. 
2009, April Oracle and Sun announce acquisition plans [
6
] [
7
] 
2009-2010 Widenius petitions to have MySQL given to third party or to have its licensing 
changed (see Widenius’ blog [8] for more detail). Attempts fail. 
 
 
Research question 1: why was the MariaDB fork started? 
 
After having faced many adverse events, the tipping point came when Widenius no longer felt 
confident in the future well-being and openness of the MySQL codebase. MySQL had been a strong 
competitor for Oracle, Widenius notes, in providing an open source alternative (with a dual licensing 
option) to Oracle’s database management product. Widenius believed that Oracle would use the 
purchase of MySQL to generate income for Oracle in one of two ways: either by “killing” MySQL 
and thereby gaining customers and market share for their product, or by changing MySQL to an open 
core business model by combining a mixture of open and closed source parts. Both of these scenarios 
were unacceptable to Widenius, and the spectre of such actions provided the impetus for starting a 
competing fork. 
 
Scenario 1: The “killing” of MySQL 
 
With the acquisition of MySQL by Sun then later by Oracle, the companies were essentially paying 
for control over the project. With this control, the company was then responsible for deciding what 
contributed code to include in each distribution. They were therefore able to decide what to release 
when. Even if the open source community or corporate communities would like to participate in the 
development of an open source program, it is possible for the governing company to turn down this 
aid, for instance by not including contributed patches or bugfixes developed by the communities. 
Given that existing versions can be shared freely among interested users, an open source product 
cannot be killed quickly or immediately by pulling it off the market, as can happen with closed 
source products. However, open source products can be starved through not including improvements 
or updates into the codebase and thereby die a slow death. The result would be a program that ceases 
to evolve and meet the changing needs of its users. Software that does not evolve becomes less and 
less satisfactory to its users over time (Lehman, 1980), and sooner or later results in the user 
abandoning the program in favour of a more up-to-date program. In such a situation, the only means 
of keeping the program “alive” is the forking of the original to continue development on a competing 
version. 
 
Scenario 2: Commercial extensions 
 
The second possible outcome for the MySQL codebase was that Oracle would change MySQL’s 
business model to an open core model by adding commercial extensions. Widenius is among those 
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7
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8
http://monty-says.blogspot.fi/2009/12/help-saving-mysql.html 
Nyman, L. (2013) “Freedom and forking in open source software: the MariaDB story”. Published in the proceedings of 
the 22
nd
 Nordic Academy of Management Conference (Reykjavik, Iceland, 21-23 August, 2013) 
who are not favourable to the open core approach. In fact, during one interview he shared that, in his 
opinion, “open core is not open source”. Even prior to its acquisition by Sun, MySQL's management 
team had been trying to implement an open core model, but Widenius had been able to block such 
attempts. If My SQL adopted an open core model, development of the codebase could continue, with 
community and corporate contributions still accepted for consideration, but not all of the resulting 
product would be open source. 
 
Common to both scenarios discussed is that the solution to maintaining the openness and further 
development of the code was to fork the program. In a scenario in which the owners of the code 
restrict its development, a fork would be necessary to be able to continue developing the code. In a 
scenario in which the owners of the code switch to including proprietary extensions, a fork would be 
necessary to maintain a version in which all future additions to the code remain open source. While 
Widenius did not know at the time which of these would happen, or even if they would happen at all, 
he viewed the possibility as enough of a threat to the future openness of the code to warrant a fork. 
Hence, MySQL was forked and MariaDB born in order to ensure that the program would be 
continued as Widenius intended: constantly evolving and entirely open source. 
 
Although Oracle would have known that a fork was a possibility, Widenius believed that Oracle 
simply considered it exceedingly unlikely that anyone would be willing to invest heavily enough into 
a fork to be able to make it successful. While forking the code itself is relatively easy, gaining 
development, marketing, consulting and services, etc. to support the project is a mammoth task, one 
requiring no small investment in time and money. Indeed, at the time of the interviews, Widenius had 
already invested several million Euros in the continued development of the codebase. Due to the sale 
of MySQL to Sun, Widenius was financially in a position that made it possible to invest money in 
developing the Maria-branch and the subsequent MariaDB fork. Furthermore, existing developers 
who already were experts in the code base were interested in working with him, a factor which 
enabled MariaDB to continue developing with little to no loss of time for the training of new talent. 
While a fork of the magnitude of MariaDB would technically be possible without money for 
development, in practice it would be a significantly more challenging endeavour to rely on 
volunteers working in their spare time
9
. 
 
Research question 2: why was the fork not instigated by earlier conflicts? 
 
There were several conflicts during MySQL’s existence before the actual fork, among them were the 
push for competing business models, internal disputes and disagreements regarding the quality of the 
product. 
 
Competing business model interests. The original (and all subsequent agreements) MySQL 
shareholder agreement included a section that requires the consent of the founders Widenius and 
Axmark to change MySQL’s license. Over the years, the MySQL management team made multiple 
attempts to change the MySQL business model to include commercial extensions. However, 
Widenius always rejected these requests given his strong support for the openness of the project. 
When MySQL was sold to Sun, the shareholders agreement was made void and Widenius no longer 
had the authority to stop such changes. Shortly after the acquisition by Sun, in the spring of 2008, 
MySQL management announced that it would include commercial extensions in the project. 
Widenius believed that Sun was unaware of this move, so therefore made no move to create an 
entirely open fork at that time. When Widenius confronted the managers at Sun regarding this change, 
                                                 
9
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they assured him that they were unaware of the plans. Soon after, the announcement was retracted
10
, 
with MySQL management noting that MySQL is and will always be free. During the codebase’s time 
under MySQL it was kept from being changed to an open core model by the shareholders 
agreement's requirement of Widenius' consent; during it’s time under Sun it was kept from being 
changed to open core by Sun management’s view that MySQL should be open source. 
 
Internal disputes. The Maria storage engine, out of which MariaDB evolved, was a topic of dispute, 
both regarding its name and the choice of the engine itself as a product. MySQL had used a storage 
engine called InnoDB. After Oracle, at the time one of MySQL’s biggest competitors, purchased 
InnoDB, MySQL started looking for a replacement. They searched for a replacement over a year 
with no luck, so Widenius led a team of developers working part-time to develop a new storage 
engine. Meanwhile, the management team at MySQL believed that the storage engine Falcon, which 
MySQL had acquired, was the better choice to focus on, rather than waiting for Maria to be 
completed. In Widenius’ opinion, the Maria engine's development received insufficient manpower 
and support from the MySQL project. Additionally, the naming of the Maria engine sparked further 
disagreement
11
.  During his time at Sun, Widenius’ primary obstacle was not direct conflict, but 
unresponsiveness. He notes that, while initially eager to “help make Sun a better open source 
company”, those he contacted in the organization seemed to ignore his attempts to help. Widenius 
eventually felt that the best way to continue to develop the MySQL code base was to leave Sun. Even 
having left Sun, taking many key MySQL developers with him, the goal was not to fork the codebase. 
On the contrary, he considered leaving Sun to be the best way to focus on the continued 
improvement of MySQL through improving his experimental version with the goal of implementing 
the improvements in the original (by selling the improvements to Sun). 
 
Quality of the product. Widenius felt Sun had released a MySQL version lacking in several key areas. 
While open about his discontent with the release, his goal was still an improved MySQL, not a fork. 
 
Faced with each of these challenges Widenius never planned to fork the MySQL codebase. These 
findings further support to the notion that there is a high threshold for competitive forking, but raise 
the question of why the fork was finally started after avoiding it for so many years. 
 
The freedom factor hypothesis 
 
The absence of a fork during the earlier conflicts highlights the active avoidance of competitive forks 
ingrained within the open source community. Due to this competing fork-averse culture, the presence 
of conflicts alone are insufficient to account for the motivational drive behind at least some 
competing forks.  
 
Earlier studies have discussed factors that enable and increase participation. It has been noted that 
managerial actions not supported by the developers can lead some developers to abandon a project, 
but there is a lack of knowledge regarding the factors that instigate a fork. The MariaDB case shows 
                                                 
10
When asked to hypothesize about what he would have done had MySQL’s management team managed to change 
MySQL to open core, Widenius notes that there was a group of developers in MySQL who had formed, ready to spit off 
into a separate entity to continue work on an open source version of MySQL. However, they would have attempted to 
work with, rather than against, MySQL, with the goal of achieving the best code possible. In other words, even then they 
would have attempted to avoid a fork. When asked if he would ever consider joining forces with Oracle to improve the 
code together, Widenius noted that he would do it “immediately” if the openness of the code were guaranteed. 
11
When it was ready for release, MySQL marketing told Widenius that it should be renamed after a bird, to fit with the 
Falcon engine, before he can release it. Widenius notes that his reply was “try and stop me”, and he released it as Maria. 
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us a set of circumstances under which a contributor goes from contributor to competitor, rather than 
the more studied transition of contributor to non-contributor. This transition only occurred after 
Widenius felt there was a credible threat to the future openness of the project. In order to more fully 
understand the motivations behind this transition, we propose the freedom factor hypothesis: limiting 
either developers’ freedoms to contribute to a project, or the freedom inherent in the current license, 
increases the likelihood of a fork. 
 
The first part, the freedom to contribute, covers concern over the ability to contribute to the code. 
There is some support for this hypothesis in the “community forks” of projects, which are sometimes 
born to enable the community to contribute code more freely, without having to abide by the 
decisions of the sponsor regarding what is accepted into the program. Furthermore, in extreme cases 
where a project has been abandoned, it is not unusual that a fork of the program is started to breathe 
new life into the project (Nyman and Mikkonen, 2011; Robles and González-Barahona, 2012). The 
second part, the freedom of the license, concerns a change toward a more commercialized software 
license. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The open source movement was born from the hacker ethic of freedom and sharing. This philosophy 
is still present in the open source community, and can motivate developer disengagement or even a 
fork if these freedoms are seen to be hampered or threatened by moves to restrict the evolution or 
distribution of the program. Competitive forking, where a developer may go from collaborator to 
competitor, is considered to be the most extreme expression of this desire for freedom and sharing. 
While the right to fork is guaranteed by all open source licenses, our findings offer further proof of 
the commonly held notion that actors in the open source community go to great lengths to avoid 
starting competitive forks. Disagreements among the developers has previously been considered to 
be a leading cause of forks in open source projects. Conversely, analysis of the events leading up to 
the MariaDB fork shows that the impetus behind the fork was a perceived threat to the freedom to 
contribute to the code, its wellbeing, and the future openness of the code base. 
 
This study shows that, in the world of open source software, ownership without trust is exceptionally 
fragile. Our findings suggest that managers/organizations must convey an unambiguous guarantee of 
the future openness of the code in order to achieve the greatest potential community contribution. 
Programmers must feel able to contribute code to a continuously developing program, which they 
feel confident will remain open source. If these criteria are not met, the likelihood of a fork increases, 
as such a situation will be unacceptable for at least some programmers. The results are explained 
through introducing the concept of the “freedom factor hypothesis”: limiting either developers’ 
freedoms to contribute to a project or the freedom inherent in the current license increases the 
likelihood of a fork. Further study is needed to validate this hypothesis. 
 
Avenues for future study 
 
Open core, business models & licensing. In sponsored open source projects, the hacker mentality and 
values co-exist with corporate interests and needs. This co-existence can work as long as the needs 
are not in significant conflict. We posit that the difference between open source and open source with 
proprietary extensions, or open code, is a significant one. Unfortunately, extant research does not 
draw a sufficiently clear line between open source and open core and is therefore of limited use in 
understanding the causal implications of this form of licensing. Further research into clarifying the 
open source community's views of open core would offer important insights into a topic that is of 
great significance to both generating income and the attracting and maintaining of contributors. In his 
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blog, Widenius notes that “You can't buy an open source project with money; the currency in open 
source is trust.” There are open core projects that have significant contributor communities and those 
that do not. Is the difference one of trust? What is the source of that trust? A further significant future 
avenue of research here would be to find out how large a group is required to precipitate a competing 
fork. 
 
The business models and project types of forks vs. parents. While Oracle can generate income 
through the dual-licensing of MySQL, MariaDB no longer owns the necessary code to do so. This 
creates a challenge in the financing of its development efforts. Future studies could examine the 
business models of forks vs. their parents to see how successfully forks manage to compete. Is it 
predominantly through a services model, or are there other approaches? Furthermore, do such forks 
commonly move from sponsored projects to community, or foundation-run projects, as in the case of 
MariaDB? Such future research could inform future managers on how to more effectively manage a 
project, as well as future developers considering a fork. 
 
Motivations for switching. While anyone can start a fork, without developers, customers and 
community it will be short-lived. MariaDB has been gaining support among all these groups. Why 
are they switching over? Some cite concerns over the future openness of the MySQL codebase, 
others a desire to be closer to the open source spirit of things, while still others note the technical 
superiority of the MariaDB codebase. There is still much research to be done in this area to get a 
clear picture of both the motivating factors and their implications. 
 
Categorization/taxonomy. Competitive forks are commonly thought to be caused by disagreements 
among the developers. A clearer understanding of what types of disagreements there are, and their 
motivations, would be valuable information to better understand the phenomenon. 
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